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Abstract
Sudden stops and international ﬁnancial crises have been a main feature of developing coun-
tries in the last three decades. While their aggregate effects are well known, the disaggregated
channels through which they work are not well explored yet. In this paper, we study the sectoral
responses that take place over episodes of sudden stops. Using job ﬂows from a sectoral panel
dataset for four Latin American countries, we ﬁnd that sudden stops are characterized as periods
of lower job creation and increased job destruction. Moreover, these effects are heterogeneous
across sectors: we ﬁnd that when a sudden stop occurs, sectors with higher dependence on exter-
nal ﬁnancing experience lower job creation. In turn, sectors with higher liquidity needs experience
signiﬁcantly larger job destruction. This evidence is consistent with the idea that dependence on
external ﬁnancing affects mainly the creation margin and that exposure to liquidity conditions af-
fects mainly the destruction margin. Overall, our results conﬁrm the large labor market effects of
sudden stops, and provide evidence of ﬁnancial conditions being an important transmission chan-
nel of sudden stops within a country, highlighting the role of ﬁnancial frictions in the restructuring
process in general.
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Many emerging economies have suffered sudden stops of capital ﬂows in the last three decades.1
These sudden stops have shown to have signiﬁcant impact on most macroeconomic aggregates, in-
cluding output growth, domestic credit and unemployment among others.2 However, little is known
about the sectoral effects of sudden stops in developing countries. Most of our knowledge on the re-
action of gross job ﬂows to shocks comes from the study of the effects of (smoother) macroeconomic
shocks –such as recessions– on job creation and destruction in developed countries (see Caballero ,
2007 and the references therein). Sudden stops are clear big shocks to emerging economies that likely
provide an extreme experiment to study the effects of negative shocks on job ﬂows. Moreover, it is
reasonable to think that the effects of sudden stops on job ﬂows should be heterogeneous, depending
on sector- and country-speciﬁc variables.
This paper extends our knowledge in this respect by looking at the effects of sudden stops on
sector level job creation and destruction in a sample of Latin American countries. By doing this,
our work also expands the current understanding of sudden stops and their effects on countries that
suffer them. It also provides additional evidence on the effects of macroeconomic shocks and inter-
national ﬁnancial crises in emerging markets. This paper also highlights how big macroeconomic
shocks are transmitted to the labor market and shows how much creation and destruction in this
market change when hit by a large ﬁnancial crises and how those effects differ across production
sectors.3
We use a panel dataset on job creation and destruction in manufacturing sectors, at the 2-digit
sector level, for four Latin American countries (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico) that covers
various time periods from 1978 to 2001. We identify sudden stops following previous deﬁnitions in
the macroeconomic literature (Calvo et al , 2006, 2008; Cavallo and Frankel , 2008; Joyce and Nabar ,
2009). Using these data, we ﬁnd that sudden stops are periods during which job creation decreases
and job destruction increases.4 In particular, we ﬁnd the effect of sudden stops on job destruction to
be larger and more robust. In the case of job creation we ﬁnd (weaker) evidence of a negative effect
of sudden stops only in the case of data coming from all plants sampled; when data for continuing
plants only is considered we ﬁnd little evidence of an effect of sudden stops on job creation at the
2-digit sector level in manufacturing.
Furthermore, we might expect some of the sectoral effects of sudden stops to be linked to ﬁnancial
channels. One can hypothesize that sectors where ﬁrms depend more on external ﬁnance, to the
ﬁrm, to suffer more from a negative external shock. Likewise, the same argument is true for ﬁrms
that face larger liquidity needs, and hence may need to have access to liquid resources from ﬁnancial
institutions more often, or in larger amounts. Motivated by this argument, we relate the sector level
gross job ﬂows to the interaction of sudden stops with proxies for external dependence and liquidity
1For example, Rothenberg and Warnock (2006) document that between 1989 and 2005 most of the time there was at
least one country experienced a sudden stop episode.
2See for example Calvo et al (2006).
3For example, see Pratap and Quintin (2008) for a description of the labor markets effects during the Tequila crisis in
Mexico.
4Job destruction takes only positive values, thus an increase in its values implies that more jobs are destroyed.
1needs of each sector.
We ﬁnd evidence that the negative effect of sudden stops on job creation is stronger in sectors
with stronger dependence on external ﬁnance, as originally measured by Rajan and Zingales (1998).5
Similarly, the positive effects of sudden stops on job destruction are stronger in sectors with higher
indicators of ﬁnancial needs (measured as the ratio of inventories over sales and the cash conversion
cycle, as suggested by Raddatz (2006)). We thus provide evidence that ﬁnancial conditions are an
important determinant of the extent of the impact of shocks on sectoral job ﬂows in a country. More-
over, these variables are meant to capture two different aspects of the ﬁnancial characteristics of a
ﬁrm, and our empirical results seem to highlight that these two facets are indeed related to different
margins of adjustment by ﬁrms when subject to a sudden stop.
These results are mostly robust to controlling for two-way ﬁxed effects, a falsiﬁcation exercise,
alternative proxies for ﬁnancial characteristics, adding additional controls, adding data for Argentina
and Uruguay, and using a different deﬁnition of our crisis variable.
The results in this paper relate to four strands of the literature. First, we draw from the existing
literature on the characteristics of sudden stops and their aggregate effects. Dornbusch et al (1995)
were the ﬁrst to refer to reversals in ﬁnancial ﬂows as sudden stops; shortly thereafter, Calvo (1998)
explored the basic mechanism and the implications of these reversals. More recently, Guidotti et al
(2004) and Calvo et al (2006) have documented the aggregate effects of sudden stops; in particular,
Calvo et al (2006) show that sudden stops are associated with a decline in GDP, TFP, investment,
and domestic credit. Related to our approach, Guidotti et al (2004) decompose the adjustment in
current account into adjustment in exports and imports and ﬁnd that countries that are more open
and have lower ﬁnancial dollarization adjust their current account mostly through exports, which
they argue are less costly than an imports-based adjustment. This connection between export-import
responses and ﬁnancial dollarization is related to our approach, but they do not look at the particular
factorsdrivingthedifferencesacrosssectors.6 Usingageneralequilibriumapproach, KehoeandRuhl
(2009) and Pratap and Urrutia (2007) study the Mexican 1994-5 crisis and Gertler et al (2006) study
the Korean performance around the Asian crisis. These papers ﬁnd that labor or ﬁnancial market
frictions improve the ability to match some stylized facts of the two sudden stops they study.7
Second, our results are related to the literature on job and worker ﬂows, labor market dynam-
ics and restructuring.8 We borrow from this literature the insight that the microeconomic channels
behind the aggregate picture gives us information on the mechanisms and the effects of particular
shocks and changes in economic conditions. One conclusion from this literature that is highly related
to our work is that ﬁrms’ reactions to (negative) shocks depend on (i) ﬁnancial aspects related to the
5We also use updated measurs of sectoral external dependence computed by Raddatz (2006), and Micco and Pagés-
Serra (2006).
6The connection between sudden stops and domestic lending by banks has been documented in Brei (2007) among
others.
7Also related to the literature is the work by Chari et al (2005) that presents a very suggestive result. They show how in
a relatively standard model of a small open economy, a sudden stop modeled as a tightening of a collateral constraint can,
under certain assumptions, generate an increase rather than a decrease in output. An important conclusion for our paper
is that other economic frictions might be needed to generate the usual output drops that accompany sudden stops. See also
the work by Mendoza and Smith (2006).
8See, for example, Caballero (2007) and Shimer (2010).
2ability of entrepreneurs to raise external funds to keep the ﬁrm running, and (ii) labor regulations that
determine the costs of destroying a job and the relative bargaining power of entrepreneurs. There is,
however, a difference in the focus between our paper and the main work in this literature; we deal
with a shock that is larger and that, at least at the country level, corresponds more to a ﬁnancial
shock, instead of business cycle variation or productivity innovations.
Third, our paper is related to a literature that deals with the effects of real exchange rates in sec-
toral ﬂows in open economies. Using ﬁrm level data for France, Gourinchas (1998) and Gourinchas
(1999) ﬁnd that following a real exchange depreciation, job creation and destruction decrease. Klein
et al (2003) use sectoral data for US manufacturing ﬁrms and ﬁnd that job destruction decreases and
net employment growth increases after a depreciation of the dollar.9 Finally, Haltiwanger et al (2004)
use the same dataset we use in this paper and conﬁrm previous results in that real exchange rate
appreciations are periods of increased job reallocation. While our methodology is related to this liter-
ature, we exploit an extreme case of an external shock, which (i) reﬂects countries’ external ﬁnancial
conditions (and probably much better than the real exchange rate) and (ii) is also more exogenous to
sector-speciﬁc situations across countries. In addition, it is worth emphasizing that the results in our
paper are robust to controlling for interactions of the real exchange rate and sectoral dummies.
Finally, our empirical approach is also related to the literature on ﬁnance and sector level out-
comes, largely started by Rajan and Zingales (1998). Braun and Larraín (2005) show, using a cross-
country sample of manufacturing industries over forty years, that industries that are more dependent
on external ﬁnance are hit harder during recessions. In a related way, Larraín (2006) shows that out-
put volatility is dampened in countries with more developed bank systems, as they provide ﬁrms
with more access to countercyclical borrowing. Raddatz (2006) studies the relation between output
volatility, country ﬁnancial development and liquidity needs at the sector level and ﬁnds that lower
ﬁnancial development magniﬁes the effects of liquidity needs on sector level volatility. Therefore, all
these three papers suggest a possible role for ﬁnancial frictions in the transmission of sudden stops to
sectors; either because there is a reduction in external funds as a whole or because particular sources
of ﬁnancing, i.e. bank lending, are affected.10
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a motivating theory on the determinants of
creation and destruction under the presence of ﬁnancial constraints as a framework for the interpre-
tation of the empirical strategy and results. Section 3 discusses the data and describes the empirical
strategy. Section 4 presents the main results of the paper together with a number of complementary
and robustness checks and section 5 brieﬂy concludes.
9See also Goldberg et al (1999) and Campa and Goldberg (2001) for related work on the effects of international factors
on employment and labor markets.
10Although not related to restructuring, Aghion et al (2007) present a model where ﬁnancial frictions induce en-
trepreneurs to choose some projects that generate liquid resources; this misallocation lies behind the connection between
volatility and growth they study.
32M OTIVATING THEORY
Our empirical strategy aims at linking responses to sudden stops with exposure to ﬁnancial con-
ditions. Let us assume that each plant p in sector i has access to resources
wipt = φi + ωiGt + εipt, (1)
where G is an indicator of aggregate conditions in the ﬁnancial markets. A sudden stop reduces the
availability of funds in the market, in particular consider the case where G is 0 in normal times and
1 when there is a sudden stop. The coefﬁcient ωi < 0 represents a sector-wide sensitivity to ﬁnancial
conditions. This implies that the effect of sudden stops on ﬁnancial resources available to plants (or
ﬁrms) is larger for sectors with larger ωi. Our variables for ﬁnancial characteristics should then be
interpreted as proxies for the ranking of sectors according to (different dimensions of) ωi.
We assume that ﬁrms (or plants) need ﬁnancial resources both to expand their production, which
implies creating new jobs, and to maintain their production levels from previous periods. Whenever
ﬁnancial resources are scarce ﬁrms adjust to the conditions through reduced expansion, thus decreas-
ing job creation, and/or by downsizing their current operations, thus increasing job destruction.
Although we can talk about ﬁnancial resources in general, the sources of funds for creating more
jobs and for maintaining the scale of production need not be the same. Bond issuance or large loans
from banks might be the most common source of funds for starting new projects or growing current
operations, particularly in emerging markets. However, simple credit lines, trade credit, or credit
from suppliers are also sources of short-term/more liquid funds used by ﬁrms while in production.
Although we expect both sets of measures to be correlated, there is no reason a priori to believe that
the correlation should be perfect and that the effects should be the same.11 Given this, it is important
for us to use measures that capture separately the “average” exposure to external ﬁnancing and
the “average” exposure to liquidity needs for each sector. When ﬁnancial markets dry up during a
sudden stop, we should expect both sources of ﬁnancing to be reduced, but the differential exposure
of sectors to each type of funding should then be reﬂected in a differentiated way on the job creation
and job destruction ﬂows.
In spite of the importance ﬁnancial conditions have on the investment and size adjustment deci-
sions by plants, we know that other variables can affect the investment decision. More importantly
for the purpose of our study, some of those variables are likely to be affected by the occurrence of
a sudden stop. Consider for example aggregate demand, which can be affected by sudden stops
through various possible channels (e.g. real exchange rate in the case of tradable sectors like man-
ufacturing); in turn it can affect demand for the goods produced in each sector differently. In our
empirical analysis we perform robustness checks, using the real exchange rate and ﬁxed effects to
control for some of these additional channels. As we explain in more detail later we observe that
although these channels play a role, they do not eliminate the direct effect of sudden stops on gross
ﬂows and the role of sectoral ﬁnancial characteristics.
11In fact, as we discuss in Section 3.1 there exists a signiﬁcant literature that has proposed different variables that capture
these differences across sectors. See for example Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Raddatz (2006), among many others.
43D ATA AND EMPIRICAL APPROACH
3.1 DATA DESCRIPTION
3.1.1 LABOR FLOWS
Data on sectoral gross ﬂows comes from Haltiwanger et al (2004). The dataset is an unbalanced
panel at the 2-digit sector level for 6 Latin American countries from 1978 to 2001. The database
was originally constructed by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) using ﬁrm level data
from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Uruguay. The original surveys record ﬂows
in workers or jobs, not in hours, hence our study captures only the extensive margin on workers.
The original country-speciﬁc data contained employment at the ﬁrm level and it was aggregated by
sectors.12
Consider a given sector and country, let p index the plants and t the period, then Ep,t represents







Notice that, by construction, this measure goes between −2, in the case of a plant that was created
between t and t − 1, and 2, in the case of a plant that was closed during the same period.
Job creation corresponds to the sum of net employment growth over all plants with positive net








where φp,t is employment share of plant p.
Job destruction is then the sum of the absolute value of net employment growth over all plants










We use data for manufacturing sectors, as it is the only data available for all countries in the orig-
inal sample available from the IADB. Each job ﬂows series is provided for 2 sets of ﬁrms: continuing
and all plants.13 Job creation data for continuing plants include information from continuing plants in
t, alive in t−1 and t; all plants/ﬁrms include all plants in t and t−1. Job destruction data for contin-
uing plants includes information from continuing plants as reported in period t; for all plants/ﬁrms
it again includes information on job destruction from all plants in t and t − 1. As previously men-
tioned, for Argentina and Uruguay, only data for continuing plants is available, and we use it in a
robustness exercise.
Panel (a) in Table 1 presents the time periods for which we have information for each country
12See Appendix Table A.3 for a description of the dataset.
13The dataset includes data on plants and ﬁrms, but for simplicity we refer only to plants.
5and the average values of creation and destruction for the whole set of six countries and for the main
group of countries in our estimation (Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico). Average job creation
of all plants is 12.3%, signiﬁcantly higher than job creation of continuing plants (9.1% for the main
countries and 7.5% considering also Argentina and Uruguay). Job destruction rate of all plants is
very close to the value of job creation (11.8%), implying that net job creation is just 0.5%. We do not
observe big differences in terms of job destruction rates among all and continuing plants. Finally, in
our sample, net job creation for continuing plants is slightly negative in average (with a rate of -1.6%).
We can see that there is large variation both in creation and destruction across countries. Mexico
presents both the highest average job creation rate (17.4%) and one of the lowest destruction rates
(10.5%) for all and continuing plants–thus, having the highest net job creation rate of all the countries.
The country with the lowest net job creation is Colombia with -0.8% for all plants and one of the
lowest (-3.7%) for continuing plants, reﬂecting a relatively low rate of creation and a relatively high
rate of destruction (especially in the case of continuing ﬁrms). In addition, if we look at the detailed
data (see Table Appendix A.1), we can observe that Mexico has the highest rates of creation (in 1996),
but Chile shows the highest destruction rates for all plants (in 1982) and Colombia for continuing
plants (in 1992). Chile also presents the largest differences between the maximum and minimum
values for creation and destruction in the sample.
These differences in gross and net labor ﬂows may be related to the dissimilar time periods for
whichwehaveinformationforthedifferentcountriesandalsotodifferentconditionsunderwhichla-
bor markets in these countries operate over these periods (including macroeconomic shocks, regula-
tions, and other country-speciﬁc variables). In the empirical analysis of this paper we study whether
sudden stops and the interaction of sudden stops with sectoral ﬁnancial characteristics may affect
these differences in creation and destruction rates.
Unfortunately, there are two dimensions that our dataset misses. First, we do not observe plant
turnover data, i.e., we have no information on ﬂows associated with closing down plants, nor the
plant ﬂows by sector. The latter dimension is important when studying the effects of ﬁnancial shocks,
as liquidity needs may drive ﬁrms out of the market if they cannot borrow to maintain operation. It
is also relevant to observe ﬁrms that change property, either because of bankruptcy procedures or
because of ﬁre-sales when in sudden stops.
Second, our dataset only includes data for formal plants/ﬁrms. This may certainly be an issue
in Latin America given the extent of informality in some countries and sectors (IADB (2004)) and
implies that we may be missing some movements along the informal-formal employment margin.
However, it is important to notice that our sample includes data just from manufacturing sectors.
IADB (2004)documentsthatinformality–measuredusingcoverageinsocialsecurityofwagedwork-
ers as a proxy– in the manufacturing sector is signiﬁcantly lower than in the rest of the economy. For
example, accordingly to IADB (2004) informality rates are 21% for Brazil (in 1999), 19% for Mexico
(in 2001), and 17% for Chile (in 2000)–as a reference, informality rates for the whole economy are 36%
for Brazil, 20% for Chile, and 34% for Mexico. Moreover, average informality measured using this
proxy for OECD countries —where arguably informality rates are quite small— is 7% (with the two
countries with the highest informality rates being Greece with 16% and France with 14%). Thus, we
think that even we may be losing some movements along the formal-informal employment margin,
6this is much less relevant in our sample than in other sectors and Latin American countries.
3.1.2 SUDDEN STOPS
We take the dates for sudden stop episodes directly from the episodes identiﬁed by Calvo et al
(2006), Calvo et al (2008), and Cavallo and Frankel (2008). In addition, we extend their deﬁnition
of sudden stops using data from the International Financial Statistics for Chile and Colombia in the
late 1970s and 1980s (countries for which we have job ﬂows data over periods that are not covered by
the above-mentioned papers). Following Joyce and Nabar (2009), and given the fact that there is no
unique empirical implementation of the deﬁnition of a sudden stop episode, we identify a country-
year observation as a sudden stop if it is identiﬁed as such by any of three papers mentioned at the
beginning of the paragraph (and by our extension of their methodologies to the 1970s and 1980s).14
Finally, we transform the monthly deﬁnition of sudden stops in the papers by Calvo et al. to
annual frequency, to match with the information in Cavallo and Frankel (2008) and in our job ﬂows
dataset. To do this, we take the fraction of months of a year in which a sudden stop is identiﬁed by
either of the papers by Calvo et al. Then the variable that combines the annual information from the
three papers corresponds to our baseline deﬁnition of sudden stop (henceforth denoted by SS).15
Table2showstheperiodsforwhichweidentifyasuddenstoptogetherwiththeyearsandmonths
for which we have job ﬂows data for each of the six countries. Panel B of Table 1 shows that there
has been a sudden stop in about 20% of the periods included in our sample. Both tables show that
we do not identify any sudden stop for Uruguay according to this deﬁnition. On the other hand, we
ﬁnd that Brazil, Chile, and Mexico have spent more than 20% of the sample period in sudden stops.
Interestingly for our identifying assumptions, with the exception of Mexico 1994-1995, all the sudden
stops identiﬁed in our sample correspond to periods of bunching of sudden stops as observed in the
work by Rothenberg and Warnock (2006), which in turn correspond to periods during which credit
conditions worsened due to exogenous reasons as documented in Gallego and Jones (2005).
3.1.3 SECTORAL FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS
We use two sets of ﬁnancial characteristics:
1. External ﬁnancing dependence: The ﬁrst sector level characteristic we use corresponds to the Rad-
datz (2006) measure of external ﬁnancing dependence (We denote it by Fin). It captures a sec-
tor’s dependence on external ﬁnancing by measuring the fraction of the assets that is ﬁnanced
with external funds (following the seminal paper by Rajan and Zingales (1998)). A sector with
a higher external ﬁnancing dependence measure should suffer more in the event of a ﬁnancial
crunch or any other reduction in the access to credit. Alternatively, we also use the Micco and
14The three empirical measures of sudden stops are correlated given the deﬁnitions are very similar among them (Joyce
and Nabar (2009)). The correlation of the sudden stop dummies in the papers by Calvo et al. is 0.81. In turn, the correlation
between Cavallo and Frankel (2008) and Calvo et al (2006), and between Cavallo and Frankel (2008) and Calvo et al (2008)
are 0.55 and 0.52, respectively.
15In addition to this variable, we also constructed a second dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if there is a sudden
stop in any month of the year. We do not present results using this variable to save space, but the results are qualitatively
the same if we use this variable instead.
7Pagés-Serra (2006)and Rajan and Zingales (1998) measures of external ﬁnancing dependence
as a robustness check (we denote them by Fin1 and Fin2, respectively).16
2. Liquidity “needs”: Following Raddatz (2006) we use the median value of the ratio of total in-
ventories to sales (denoted by Inv/Sales) across ﬁrms in each sector as our main proxy for the
liquidity needs of ﬁrms. Alternatively, we also use the cash conversion cycle (denoted by CCC),
which corresponds to an estimate of the length in days between the moment a ﬁrm pays for the
raw materials and the moment it ﬁnally receives the payment for the sale of the ﬁnal goods it
produces.17
All the original external ﬁnancing dependence and the liquidity needs variables were calculated
for 3-digit sectors. Given that our data for labor ﬂows contains information for 2-digit sectors, in our
main speciﬁcations, we use the median value of each indicator across 3-digit sectors within a 2-digit
sector.18
It is worth emphasizing that these measures capture different dimensions of the ﬁnancial needs
of ﬁrms, and, as we discussed in section 2, relate to different types of ﬁnancial funds ﬁrms need.
The ﬁrst set, based on the initial Rajan-Zingales approach, measures dependence related to the use
(in equilibrium) of external funds in asset acquisition, and hence it relates more to long-run and
investment decisions. In turn, the liquidity needs measures explicitly capture ﬁnancial needs arising
from delays between production and sales revenue collection. This is obviously related to short-run
liquidity needs and the dependence on ﬁnancial markets to cope with them during the production
process. This separation is in line with the evidence in the existing literature and with the discussion
in section 2.
Interestingly, the Spearman (Kendall) rank correlation between both proxies for different margins
of ﬁnancial characteristics for the nine sectors we use in this paper is just 0.28 (0.17) and we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that both series are independent among them, with a p-value of 0.46 (0.60).
This indeed shows that both margins of ﬁnancial frictions are different, which is key for the empirical
analysis and the interpretation of the results of this paper.
3.1.4 COUNTRY LEVEL VARIABLES
We use a number of country-level characteristics in our regressions. We list them here.
1. We use a labor regulation proxy from Botero et al (2004). Following Micco and Pagés-Serra
(2006), we focus on the sum of the cost of ﬁring workers and the number of procedures required
to dismiss a worker. The cost of ﬁring workers is a measure of how expensive it is for a ﬁrm to
ﬁre 20% of the workers; it includes all the compensations and penalties needed to pay in this
case. The dismissal procedures variable counts the number of measures a ﬁrm must undertake
16See Table 9.
17See Table 9.
18The two alternative measures of Financial Dependence (Fin1 and Fin2) consider the mean of the same measure across
sub-sectors in each 2-digit sector. Consequently, the different measures have different sensitivity to heterogeneity within
each 2-digit sector. We chose to use the Raddatz (2006) measure of external dependence in our main speciﬁcations given
that is computed using the same procedure as our proxies for liquidity needs.
8in order to be able to dismiss a worker. The highest value of the labor regulation measure in
our sample corresponds to Mexico with 1.28 out of a maximum of 2; the minimum is 0.24 in
Uruguay (see Table 1 Panel B).
2. In addition, in order to have a proxy for labor market regulations that changes by country
within our sample, we use a variable for labor market reforms from Heckman and Pagés-Serra
(2004). They identify years in which the countries included in our dataset implemented reforms
that either reduced or increased the legal protection to workers. Our proxy takes a value of 1
if the country implemented labor reforms that increased legal protection of workers, a value of
−1 if the country implemented labor reforms that decreased legal protection of workers, and a
value of 0 if the country did not implemented a labor reform.19 In our sample, Brazil in 1985
and Chile in 1991 implemented reforms increasing legal protection to workers and Colombia in
1990 implemented reforms decreasing legal protection to workers.
3. We use a rule of law proxy from La Porta et al. (1998). The variable is constructed by the
country-risk rating agency International Country Risk (ICR) and corresponds to the assessment
of the law and order tradition in the country averaged over the 1982-1995 period. The index
goes from 0 to 10, with lower scores for less tradition for law and order. The highest value of
the rule of law measure in our sample corresponds to Chile with 7.02 and the minimum is 2.08
in Colombia (see Table 1 Panel B).
4. We use a measure of trade openness recently developed by Chang et al (2009) that corresponds
to the residual of a regression of the log of the ratio of exports and imports (in 1995 US$) to
GDP (in 1995 US$), on the logs of area and population, and dummies for oil exporting and for
landlocked countries. We use the average of the measure over the period for which we have
labor ﬂows information for each country.20 The highest value of the this measure in our sample
corresponds to Mexico with 73.1% and the minimum is 17.5% in Brazil (see Table 1 Panel B).
5. Finally, weuseadummyfordefactoﬁxedexchangerateregimesfromLevy-YeyatiandSturzeneg-
ger (2003) to study how differences in the exchange rate regime affects our results.21 Using this
proxy we ﬁnd the following episodes of ﬁxed exchange rate regimes in the years included in
our sample: Argentina (1992-2001), Brazil (1998 and 2000), Chile(1980-1981), and Mexico (1994).
3.2 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Motivated by the discussion in section 2 and the existing literature, we proceed to study the case
of sudden stops in Latin America. In particular, we look for evidence on the following hypotheses:
1. Firms in sectors depending more on external ﬁnance should be more affected during sudden
19We have experimented with alternative ways of constructing this variable –ie. using different dummies for increasing
and decreasing the legal protection of workers–ﬁnding similar results. We chose this speciﬁcation for parsimony.
20Using the time variant version of the variable yields very similar results, thus suggesting that most of the identiﬁcation
for the effects of trade openness in our sample occurs at cross-country and not at the within country level.
21We also experimented with other transformations of the Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) indicators of exchange
rate regimes ﬁnding similar results, but for parsimony and easiness of interpretation we use this dummy.
9stops. Thus, creation will be lower in these sectors. The effect on destruction is ambiguous as
plants can adjust their sizes.
2. Firms in sectors more exposed to liquidity needs are likely to destroy more during a sudden
stop.
Weuseourdataonjobﬂowsfromcontinuingversusallplantstocontrasttheeffectoftheﬁnancial
shock on the complete sample of plants versus those that have survived between two consecutive
periods to shed some light on the potential role of plant closing and opening in the process.
Then, we seek evidence along these lines using data on gross job ﬂows in Latin America, over a
sample period where these countries suffered signiﬁcant sudden stops. We estimate the following
equation:
yijt = αSjt + δmjSjt + ρziSjt + µ + εijt, (5)
where yijt is some measure of job ﬂows (mainly creation and destruction and in some speciﬁcations
netemploymentgrowth)insectori, country j, andtime t, S isameasureofexternalshockstoﬁnancial
conditions –sudden stops in this paper–, mj is a vector of country speciﬁc institutional variables (e.g.
labor market regulation and a proxy for the rule of law), zi is a vector of sector speciﬁc characteristics
(e.g. ﬁnancial dependence and liquidity needs), and µ is a vector of ﬁxed effects that includes country,
year and sector ﬁxed effects, and in some speciﬁcations it also includes interactions of (any two) of
them. Finally, all sector and country variables are included as deviations with respect to their sample
means to facilitate interpretation.
Theinteractioneffects(ziSjt and mjSjt)arethemostimportantpartofthisregressionfortestingthe
mainhypothesesofourpaper. Thesectorspeciﬁccharacteristicsarerelatedtoﬁnancialcharacteristics
of the sectors, and we will follow the existing literature assuming that at least part of the observed
differences across sectors in ﬁnancial outcomes is associated with technological differences. Thus,
the α coefﬁcients reﬂect estimates of the effects of sudden stops on an average country and on the
average sector, and hence gives an estimate of the baseline effect of the sudden stops on labor ﬂows.
In many cases sudden stops are accompanied by abrupt changes in relative prices, particularly in
the real exchange rate. Consequently our sudden stop variable may be capturing, partially at least,
the effect of real exchange rate changes during the periods of current account reversals. We thus add
the real exchange rate (in different speciﬁcations) to our baseline regression, and we estimate
yijt = αSjt + δmjSjt + ρziSjt +∑
i
πiRERjt + µ + νijt, (6)
where all variables are as deﬁned in equation (5), and RERjt is a measure of the real exchange rate
and we allow π to be different for each sector in order to capture different sensitivities to relative
prices, which might be due to different degrees of tradability, among other factors.
As has been noted before, our main analysis restricts the sample of countries to Brazil, Chile,
Colombia and Mexico. There are two different reasons to drop Argentina and Uruguay. First, we do
not identify any sudden stop in Uruguay during the years for which we have job ﬂows data. Second,
the nature of the original surveys from which data was collected in both countries differs from the
10rest. For both countries there is no information on new plants, as only continuing plants are observed
in their sampling. This lack of data makes it impossible to compare continuing and all plants data.22
We also implement some additional regressions adding additional controls and interactions (such
as trade openness, the exchange rate regime, and labor market reforms) and implement some instru-
mental variable regressions. Given that these exercises are mostly additional checks, we discuss them
in Section 4.
3.3 IDENTIFICATION
Sector level data allows us to control for unobserved country characteristics and rely on particular
sector speciﬁc (but not country-sector speciﬁc) variables to identify sector speciﬁc effects of sudden
stops. Part of this effect comes from interaction effects between sector characteristics and the preva-
lence of sudden stops, e.g. we expect sectors that rely more on external ﬁnancing or have less access
to collateral to suffer more during a sudden stop than sectors with better chances of self-ﬁnancing its
operations (or at least part of them). The same argument follows for the liquidity related variables,
as the source of identiﬁcation is the same.
Our identiﬁcation of differentiated sectoral sensitivity to sudden stops relies on the assumption
that any determinant of the sudden stop (or its size) may not to be systematically correlated with
sector characteristics that determine the sensitivity of ﬁrms in each sector to the sudden stop, which
in our case are ﬁnancial dependence and liquidity needs (or any other sector characteristic that is
correlated with any of these two characteristics). Notice that it does not require the sudden stop to be
independent of country characteristics, but to be uncorrelated with determinants of the sector speciﬁc
sensitivity to them. We believe this condition to be weaker than the one we would need to identify
direct effects of sudden stops on creation and destruction.
Our discussion above implies that of the two sets of estimates we obtain, it is more plausible to
give some structural or causal interpretation to the sector characteristics. Even if we were not able
to interpret some of the coefﬁcients as causal effects, our results can still be interpreted as stylized
facts about correlations between ﬁnancial characteristics and the extent of the equilibrium response
of sectoral gross job ﬂows to sudden stops.
We also implement a falsiﬁcation exercise to check for our identiﬁcation assumptions. We run
our equations using lagged creation/destruction rates (ie., yijt−1) as the left-hand side variable. If we
found a signiﬁcant effect of sudden stops in the future and/or of interactions of sudden stops in the
future with sectoral ﬁnancial characteristics on job ﬂows today, that would imply that there is either
reverse causality or some omitted variable(s) is(are) driving our results. Albeit certainly imperfect,
this procedure allows us to check our basic identiﬁcation assumptions.
Finally, a small comment on our proxies for sectoral ﬁnancial characteristics. The use of US-based
measures has caused some controversy in the literature because of the assumption that we can ex-
trapolate to different countries. There are two elements to consider in this respect. First, there is
evidence that rankings based on the Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure of ﬁnancial dependence per-
22We also present results using all countries in Table 8 and there we can observe that our main conclusions do not depend
on this selection criteria.
11forms well in other countries (Ilyina and Samaniego (2008)). Second, as we are interested in intrinsic
(most likely technological) characteristics that make sectors differ in their ﬁnancial decisions, we can
think of equation (5) either as the reduced form of an IV estimation where the US-based measure is
used as an instrument for the country speciﬁc variables or as an equation in which the interactions
if sudden stops and ﬁnancial sector characteristics are affected by attenuation bias (Raddatz (2006)).
Therefore, we do not think it is a problem to use US-based measures of sector characteristics and, if
anything, our estimates are biased towards 0 because of attenuation bias, so they are conservative
estimates of the interaction effects related to sectoral ﬁnancial characteristics.
4R ESULTS
Following, our previous discussion, we start presenting our basic results for the estimated effects
of sudden stops on job creation and job destruction, in Tables 3 and 4 respectively. In both tables we
present two panels: in panel A we show results of job ﬂows using data from all plants and in panel B
we show estimates using job ﬂows from continuing ﬁrms only. In addition, in each table we present
eight different speciﬁcations. In the ﬁrst three columns we present the direct effect of sudden stops
and include interactions of sectoral ﬁnancial characteristics and sudden stops (in columns 1 and 2
including separately each characteristic and in column 3 including both at the same time). Next, in
column 4 we include interactions of sudden stops with two country level characteristics that may
affect the reactions of the economy to sudden stops: proxies for labor market regulations and the
rule of law. In columns 5 to 7 we include two-way ﬁxed effects to check the robustness of results in
column 4 to include: country∗ year ﬁxed effects (column 5), sector∗ year ﬁxed effects (column 6), and
country∗sector ﬁxed effects (column 7). Finally, in column 8 we include interactions of the (log of the)
real exchange rate and sector dummies to see whether the estimated effects are not being confounded
by the heterogeneous impact of real exchange rate ﬂuctuations at the sectoral level.23
4.1 SUDDEN STOPS AND LABOR FLOWS
The main results for the effects of sudden stops on creation and destruction by all ﬁrms can be
observed in the top row of panel A in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 shows the effects on job creation,
where we estimate a consistently negative effect of between −2.3% and −3.1%, depending on the
speciﬁcation. Results in Panel B imply that the negative impacts on creation by continuing ﬁrms are
also negative but smaller suggesting that the effects of sudden stops on the extensive margin of
creation could be more relevant. The results for job destruction are in the ﬁrst row of each panel in
Table 4; there we observe that the negative impact of sudden stops on destruction are between −4.8
and −5.2%. In this case, we see that the effect of sudden stops is not sensitive to whether the sample
is restricted to only continuing plants or not.
The estimated effects are also economically relevant. During sudden stops destruction is between
40% and 62% larger than in an average year (in the average sector and country), implying a very
large effect of sudden stops on labor ﬂows. Results for creation rates of all ﬁrms imply a negative
23Notice that when using country∗ year ﬁxed effects we cannot identify the direct effect of sudden stops since this ﬁxed
effect annihilates the effect of any other variable that varies at the country∗ year level.
12effect which is equivalent to about 20% of creation in the average year.
Although not the central results of our paper and not surprising, these results are important,
particularly because they imply that labor market ﬂows (and potentially frictions) are relevant in any
model that wants to explain the economic effects of sudden stops on a developing economy. To study
in more detail this point, we now move to sectoral effects.
4.2 SECTORAL EFFECTS
While the results on the average effect of sudden stops are important and highlight an aggregate
pattern for the effects in manufacturing sectors, they also hide signiﬁcant differences across sectors.
In particular, we focus on ﬁnancial fragility or exposure to ﬁnancial market conditions. As previous
literature and our motivation theory suggest, both dimensions are likely to affect hiring and ﬁring
decisions by ﬁrms: new projects may be delayed, some plants/ﬁrms may reduce their scale because
of ﬁnancing problems, etc.24
4.2.1 FINANCIAL DEPENDENCE
The rows labeled Fin*SS in Tables 3 and 4 correspond to the estimated effects of the interaction of
the Raddatz (2006) measure of ﬁnancial dependence by sector with the sudden stop variable. In all
speciﬁcations including creation rates as dependent variables, the coefﬁcient for Fin*SS is negative as
can be seen in both panels of Table 3. Moreover, the estimates are statistically signiﬁcant in 13 of the
16 columns. The cases in which this interaction is not statistically signiﬁcant are: the speciﬁcations
in which we control for sector ∗ year ﬁxed effects in both panels (column 6) and the speciﬁcation for
all plants in which we control for sector ∗ country ﬁxed effects (column 7 in panel A). Given that the
introduction of these two-way ﬁxed effects may be decreasing the efﬁciency of the estimates without
affecting the consistency of them, we implement simple Hausman tests in which we compare our
estimates for this interaction with estimates that do not include these two-way ﬁxed effects (column
4 in both panels). Under the null, both estimates are consistent and the estimates that do not include
two-way ﬁxed effects are more efﬁcient. Results imply that we cannot reject the null hypothesis and
therefore we prefer the more efﬁcient estimates (without two-way ﬁxed effects).25 Interestingly, the
estimated interaction effects do not seem to be different in both panels.26
Our main results using Fin*SS (column 4) suggest that during a year long sudden stop, job cre-
ation in the sector with the highest ﬁnancial exposure is approximately 2.1 percentage points smaller
than in the sector with the smallest ﬁnancial exposure, and approximately 1.7 percentage points
smaller than in the average sector of our sample.27
In contrast to job creation, our estimates for the effect of Fin*SS on destruction rates are positive,
24Another margin refers to destruction of plants and the consequent separation of workers, unfortunately, as we men-
tioned before, due to lack of data, we cannot study this channel. Similarly, we cannot follow plants individually, thus we
cannot track what fraction of the changes comes from reductions within a ﬁrm and how much comes from changes in the
number and size of ﬁrms that enter and exit the market. We leave both aspects as topics for further research.
25The relevant p-values are the following: 0.34 for column 6 in panel A, 0.50 for column 6 in panel B, and 0.22 for column
7 in panel A.
26We also run a “pooled” speciﬁcation with data from both continuing and all plants and ﬁnd similar results.
27The same numbers are 2.0 and 1.6, respectively, for continuing plants only.
13but never statistically different from 0 (except for the case of column 2 in panel A when we do not
control for our measure of liquidity needs). This is consistent with our theoretical motivation and
implies that for the destruction margin the effect of sudden stops on sectoral ﬂows do not depend
signiﬁcantly from ﬁnancial dependence of the ﬁrms.
4.2.2 LIQUIDITY NEEDS
Theresultsforshort-runliquidityneedsareintherowslabeled(I/S)*SS(forinventoriesoversales)
in Tables 3 and 4. We observe that in Table 3 most of the coefﬁcients for (I/S)*SS are negative, they
are never statistically signiﬁcant. The opposite picture arises in the case of job destruction in Table 4,
where the coefﬁcients are always positive and statistically different from 0 in most speciﬁcations (in
13 out of 16 estimates). As in the previous regressions for Fin*SS, the estimates are not statistically
signiﬁcant in columns 6 in both panels and in column 8 in panel A. As before, to check whether the
inclusion of two-way ﬁxed effects (in this case sector∗ year ﬁxed effects) are affecting the consistency
or just the efﬁciency of the estimates, we performed Hausman tests and found that the estimates of
columns 4 and 6 in both panels are not statistically different among them.28 Therefore, we conclude
that the lack of signiﬁcance of estimates in column 6 in both panels is due to inefﬁciency and not to
bias in the estimates effects without including sector∗ year ﬁxed effects.
In the case of estimates in column 8 in Table 4 (i.e. the effects of sudden stops on job destruction),
the (I/S)*SS term is statistically signiﬁcant only for continuing plants and decreases in magnitude
implying that part of the effects of the ﬁnancial characteristics of the sectors are more related to
heterogenous effects of real exchange rate movements on destruction. The fact that the decrease in
the point estimates is relatively small (it decreases by just about 15% from estimates in column 4), and
that the coefﬁcient is similar for both continuing and all plants makes us believe that overall (I/S)*SS
has a negative effect on destruction rates.
The estimated results regarding the impact of (I/S)*SS are also economically relevant in magni-
tude. For the case of continuing plants, on average the sector with the highest value for (I/S)*SS
exhibits a job destruction ﬂow 2.3 percentage points higher than the sector with the lowest value
(considering our most conservative estimate in column 8 Panel A). This difference represents ap-
proximately 50% of the effect of a sudden stop on job destruction in the average sector.29 Overall,
these results suggest that patterns of job ﬂows across sectors during a sudden stop are related to the
ﬁnancial characteristics of the sectors.
4.2.3 FINANCIAL FACTORS OVERALL
It is important to emphasize that our results suggest that our measures of ﬁnancial characteristics,
ﬁnancial dependence and liquidity needs, are related to different margins. First, this dichotomy is
interesting from an empirical point of view and we believe it to be reasonable, given the way the
proxy variables are constructed and what they are supposed to capture. Furthermore, these effects
28The relevant p-values are the following: 0.92 for column 6 in Panel A and 0.36 for column 6 in Panel B.
29Similar calculations for only continuing ﬁrms yield a 2.1 percentage point increase in job destruction for the sector with
the highest value of (I/S) with respect to the sector with the lowest value, and an effect which is equivalent to 37% of the
effect of a sudden stop on the average manufacturing sector (we also use estimates in column 8).
14on separate margins are also robust to changes in the speciﬁcation of the regressions. Second, this is
a new result in the literature on ﬁnancial frictions and sector outcomes; previous results have shown
that both dimensions are correlated with sectoral variation and volatility at the sectoral level, but do
not distinguish between creation and destruction margins –because of the lack of data.30 Thus, our
results are also consistent with the evidence in Raddatz (2006), who ﬁnds that liquidity variables,
and not the external ﬁnancing ones, explain growth volatility in a panel sample of manufacturing
sectors; the magnitude of our results imply that liquidity variables produce a larger variation in the
observed ﬂows than external ﬁnancing variables do.
Finally, analyzingtwoseparatemarginsongrossﬂowsallowsustodepictaslightlymoredetailed
picture of the mechanics behind some of the observed results regarding ﬁnancial characteristics. We
interpret our results as evidence that there is indeed a connection to both aspects of ﬁnance and that
we are not capturing a more general idea of ﬁnancial constraints, with each gross margin having a
closer relation to one of the ﬁnance characteristics, with the extent of this relation partially hidden
when looking at a more macro level. From the point of view of the effects of sudden stops, the point
estimates also suggest that ﬁnancial characteristics play a role in net job ﬂows and total reallocation,
deﬁned as the sum of creation and destruction for a sector, during a sudden stop. We turn to this
point in the next section.
4.3 SUDDEN STOPS,F INANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS, AND NET LABOR GROWTH
In this section we extend our previous analysis by estimating equation 5 using net labor ﬂows as
the left-hand side variable. Table 5 presents the results of estimating models similar to those in the
previous section. We also present estimates for all plants and for continuing plants separately in each
panel. Given the close relationship with results in the previous sections we focus on the main results
in Table 5.
Consistent with the results in the previous section, sudden stops have a signiﬁcantly robust and
negative effect on net creation at the sector level. The estimates for the sample including all ﬁrms
imply that net employment growth decreases between 7.5 and 8 percentage points in a year with a
sudden stop. The results for the dataset including job ﬂows of continuing ﬁrms are slightly lower in
absolute value with point of between −5.6 and −5.9 percentage points.
Regarding the sectoral impact of sudden stops on net employment growth, point estimates con-
ﬁrm results of negative impact of both dimensions (external dependence and liquidity needs) on the
effect of sudden stops on net labor ﬂows. However, results in these cases are slightly less robust to
the inclusion of both ﬁnancial variables together, but in no case signs are overturned. In general,
the interaction of sudden stops with our proxy for sectoral external dependence (Fin*SS) is always
signiﬁcant and with point estimates fairly robust (except for inefﬁcient models in column 6 in both
panels in which the inclusion of sector*year ﬁxed effects affect the efﬁciency of the estimates without
affecting point estimates, as discussed before). In turn, the interaction of sudden stops with liquidity
needs (I/S*SS) presents the expected sign but is signiﬁcant in just four speciﬁcations.
However, if we consider the size of the estimated impacts on net employment growth, both vari-
30See for example Braun and Larraín (2005), Raddatz (2006) and references therein.
15ables have impacts of the same order of magnitude (using our preferred estimates in Panel A, column
4). The sector with the highest external dependence decreases net employment growth by 2.8 per-
centage points less than the sector with lowest value for external dependence when there is a year
long sudden stop. A similar calculation regarding liquidity needs imply a differential net growth of
3.9 percentage points. However, these effects are not precisely estimated. Thus, our reading of these
results is that probably the lack of signiﬁcance of (I/S*SS) is more related with precision problems
than with a zero impact on net employment growth.
4.4 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
In order to check the robustness of our results we perform four different groups of exercises. The
ﬁrst two exercises are related to study the identiﬁcation strategy we use in the paper. The second
set of exercises are related to include additional control and interaction variables. The third set of
exercises are related to using alternative proxies for sectoral ﬁnancial characteristics. The ﬁnal set of
exercises relate to changing the sample on which we are estimating.
4.4.1 FALSIFICATION EXERCISES
In Table 6 we present a set of falsiﬁcation exercises in which we run the same speciﬁcations of
column 4 in Tables 3 and 4 but using the lag of our gross job ﬂows measures as the left-hand side
variables in each regression. Our aim is to study the endogeneity of our sudden stop variables to
overall and sectoral job shocks. If we found a positive effect of sudden stops in the future and/or of
interactions of sudden stops in the future with sectoral ﬁnancial characteristics on job ﬂows today,
that would imply that there is either reverse causality or any other omitted variable is driving our
results. Albeit certainly imperfect, this procedure allows us to check this basic identiﬁcation assump-
tion.
Table 6 presents the results. Interestingly, none of the variables has a signiﬁcant impact on lagged
creation and destruction rates. Moreover, the size of the estimated effects are clearly smaller than
those estimated in previous tables suggesting that the lack of signiﬁcance is not due to increases in
the estimated standard errors. Thus, we conclude from this table that our results are not driven by
reverse causality or other biases related to the potential endogeneity of sudden stops to domestic
omitted variables affecting both job ﬂows and sudden stops.
4.4.2 SUDDEN STOPS AND FINANCIAL CRISES
Next, we study how our results are related to the potential effects of sudden stops on ﬁnancial
crises. Our theoretical argument relates mainly to ﬁnancial market conditions and, therefore, we
could study how sudden stops affect job ﬂows through their effects on banking crises. To implement
this idea we follow the literature and use the ﬁnancial crises identiﬁed in Caprio et al (2003) (and
used by several papers, e.g. Cerra and Saxena (2008)). We identify a systematic ﬁnancial crisis with
a dummy that takes a value of 1 for all the years marked as crisis years in that paper (we denote this
dummy variable by FC). Caprio et al (2003) identify ﬁnancial systemic crises in our sample for the
16following years: Argentina (1995, 2001), Brazil (1994-1999), Chile (1981-1986), Colombia (1982-1987),
and Mexico (1994-1997).
Given that a share of these ﬁnancial crises is domestic in nature, and therefore highly endogenous,
we implement an IV procedure in which we use sudden stops as an instrumental variable for FC. This
way, we identify the effect of FC on job ﬂows that is due to the effect of sudden stops on a ﬁnancial
crisis. Our estimates in Tables 3 and 4 could be interpreted as reduced forms of these IV regressions.
Due to collinearity problems, we can only identify the interaction effects.31 This is not a fundamental
problem, as the main focus of the paper is the identiﬁcation of these interaction effects.
We report these results in Table 7. Before going to the instrumental variable estimates, we discuss
the ﬁrst stages.32 In the ﬁrst stage regression for Fin*FC, the interaction Fin*SS is statistically signif-
icant (with a coefﬁcient of 0.29 and t-stat of 4.09) but the interaction (I/S)*SS is not different from 0
(with a coefﬁcient of -0.08 and a t-stat of -0.17). Analogously, in the ﬁrst stage for (I/S*FC), the interac-
tion the interaction (I/S)*SS is statistically signiﬁcant (with a coefﬁcient of 0.27 and t-stat of 3.68) but
the interaction Fin*FC is not different from 0 (with a coefﬁcient of 0.0001 and a t-stat of 0.01). In terms
of diagnostic tests for underidentifcation, the Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic is 8.79 thus we reject the
null hypothesis of under-identiﬁcation (with a p-value of 0.003). In terms of weak identiﬁcation, the
Cragg-Donalds F statistic of weak identiﬁcation–suggested by Stock and Yogo (2002)– is 4.51, very
close to the 15% maximal IV size of 4.58 and, therefore, we do not seem to have a problem of weak
instruments. Thus, these results suggest that the IVs have the expected signs in the ﬁrst stage and
are statistically signiﬁcant and that the IV estimates do not suffer from a weak instruments or an
under-identiﬁcation problem.
We report IV results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7. Estimates related to creation ﬂows are mostly
consistent with our estimates in Table 3: only the interaction between ﬁnancial crises and Fin is
positive and statistically signiﬁcant. The point estimate is actually bigger than in Table 3 suggesting
that, as expected, when a sudden stop creates a ﬁnancial crisis its impacts are ampliﬁed by sectoral
ﬁnancial frictions.
Results for destruction rates are less precisely estimated. The point estimates for the interaction
of (I/S) and FC are bigger than the point estimates for interaction of Fin and FC. This is consistent
with our results in Table 4. However, the interaction of (I/S) and FC is only marginally signiﬁcant
(p-values of 0.12 and 0.11 in Panels A and B, respectively).33 As in case of the point estimates of the
interaction between Fin and FC, point estimates are bigger than the estimates in Table 4, suggesting
that also in this case ﬁnancial frictions amplify the effects of sudden stops that produce banking
crises, as expected.
In all, results in this section give additional evidence that is consistent with our theoretical moti-
vation emphasizing the potential effects of sudden stops through ﬁnancial channels.
31The complete IV procedure to estimate an speciﬁcation that is analogous to our preferred estimates in Tables 3 and 4
imply the estimation using 5 variables as instruments for 5 potentially endogenous variables (SS, SS*Fin, SS*(I/S), SS*labor,
and SS*rule-of-law). This procedure yielded unreliable second stage estimates due to the collinearity in the ﬁve ﬁrst stages.
32These results are available upon request.
33If we just include the interaction between (I/S) and FC, the estimate coefﬁcient is statistically different from 0 with
p-values of 0.06 in both panels.
174.4.3 ADDITIONAL CONTROL VARIABLES
In the next group of exercises we add additional controls related to policy characteristics of the
countries. Given the fact that we only have four countries in our main estimations, we do not have
enough data variation to derive clear implications on the direct effects of these variables on gross
ﬂows. Thus, we take these exercises mostly as robustness checks to our initial estimates and focus
on how our interactions of sudden stops and sectoral ﬁnancial characteristics change. The three
variables we use are: the degree of trade openness of the countries, the exchange rate regime, and a
proxy for labor market reform.34 In each case we present in Table 8 the coefﬁcients on variables of
interest (Fin*SS and (I/S)*SS) and triple-interactions with each variable.
We start with trade openness. Results in column 1 in both panels imply that for job creation the
interaction SS*Fin is statistically signiﬁcant an maintains the size even after controlling for the direct
and interactive effects of trade openness. No triple interaction is statistically signiﬁcant suggesting
that the degree of trade openness does not affect how frictions affect sudden stop shocks. Regarding
job destruction rates (see column 6), similar results appear: as in our basis case, only the interaction
(I/S)*SS is statistically signiﬁcant and the introduction of triple interactions does not affect the esti-
mated coefﬁcients in comparison to the results we obtain in Table 4 (even in the case of Panel B, the
estimated coefﬁcient is more precisely estimated).
Next, we consider the exchange rate regime using a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the de
facto exchange rate regime is classiﬁed as ﬁxed accordingly to Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003).
Results appear in columns 2 and 7 in Table 8. The estimated effect of SS*Fin on the creation margin
for all ﬁrms is very similar to the estimated effects on Table 3 but is only marginally signiﬁcant (p-
value of 0.15). Interestingly, however, the triple interaction of this variable with the ﬁxed exchange
rate regime variable is negative and an F test of the sum the coefﬁcients on SS*Fin and the triple
interaction yields that the sum of the two coefﬁcients is different from 0 (p-value of 0.06). In the
case of the estimated effects for creation for continuing ﬁrms SS*Fin is statistically signiﬁcant and the
triple interaction is very close to 0.
Regarding effects on the destruction margin (in column 7), for both continuing and all ﬁrms,
(I/S)*SS is statistically signiﬁcant and presents a very similar value to the one we obtained in Table
4. The triple interaction in this case is negative and important in absolute value but not statistically
signiﬁcant. We take these results as suggestive that the results we ﬁnd in Tables 3 and 4 are robust,
but also as suggestive (weak) evidence that the exchange rate regime may interact in a differentiated
way with ﬁnancial frictions in the creation and destruction margins. We leave a detailed study of this
point for future research.
The third policy dimension we study is labor market regulation. We use a variable identiﬁed
using information from Heckman and Pagés-Serra (2004). As previously discussed our proxy takes a
valueof1ifthecountryimplementedlaborreformsthatincreasedlegalprotectionofworkers, avalue
of −1 if the country implemented labor reforms that decreased legal protection of workers, and a
valueof0ifthecountrydidnotimplementedalaborreform. Resultsarepresentedincolumns3and8
in Table 8. On the creation margin, SS*Fin is statistically signiﬁcant and keeps a value similar to those
34We thank the referees for suggesting us to perform exercises using these variables.
18estimated in Table 3 in both panels. The triple interactions are not statistically signiﬁcant. In turn,
on the destruction margin, results in Panels A and B show that (I/S)*SS is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant, even tough the point estimates decrease. No triple interaction is signiﬁcant.
Summarizing, we interpret these results mostly as robustness checks of our main results in Tables
3 and 4, and they usually conﬁrm our baseline results.35
4.4.4 DIFFERENT SAMPLE COVERAGE
In this set of robustness checks we study whether our main results are robust to two variations in
the sample coverage on which we estimate. The ﬁrst relates to excluding Mexico from the estimating
sample. We perform this exercise because as discussed in Section 3.1, the sudden stop the literature
identiﬁes for Mexico is probably highly related to domestic conditions. Even tough we already have
presented exercises that deal with the potential endogeneity of sudden stops, we present this exercise
as an additional robustness check. Columns 4 and 9 in Table 8 present the results. Results are very
similar to the ones presented in Tables 3 and 4: a positive and signiﬁcant interaction (I/S)*SS for
destruction rates, and a negative and signiﬁcant interaction Fin*SS for creation rates. If anything the
results in these columns are more precisely estimated than those in Tables 3 and 4, in spite of the
decrease in the sample size.
Finally, we include Argentina and Uruguay in our sample for estimates using data for only con-
tinuing ﬁrms. In all the previous tables we include in both panels the same country coverage in order
to allow us comparing between continuing and all plants while maintaining the same pool of coun-
tries. Here we expand the sample coverage to these two additional countries and present the results
in columns 5 and 10 of Panel B of Table 8. Results for our two interactions remain signiﬁcant and the
estimated coefﬁcients are very similar to those we present in Tables 3 and 4.
4.4.5 DIFFERENT MEASURES OF SECTORAL FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS
As we discussed in Section 3.1 there are different measures of ﬁnancial sector characteristics avail-
able in the literature. In this section we present regressions in which we use two alternative proxies
for external dependence (the Micco and Pagés-Serra (2006) and Rajan and Zingales (1998) proxies
for external dependence, which we denote Fin1 and Fin2, respectively) and one alternative proxy for
liquidity needs (CCC). Table 9 presents the results. In columns 1 and 4 we present our main spec-
iﬁcation using Fin1 as the proxy for external dependence at the sectoral level. The estimated effect
of the SS*Fin1 variable is positive and economically and statistically signiﬁcant with point estimates
of the same order of magnitude as the estimated effects for the SS*Fin. Regarding the destruction
35In another robustness exercise, we add interactions of the high yield spreads (HYS) in the US with the sectoral ﬁnancial
characteristics to equation (5). Previous research treats a big rise in HYS as a (common) exogenous negative shock to exter-
nal ﬁnancing conditions for emerging markets and, as such, as a determinant of a potential sudden stop, see for example
Caballero and Panageas (2007), and Gallego and Jones (2005). Thus, when adding this continuous indicator of external
conditions (such as HYS) to our proxies for SS, we are studying whether the assumption in the literature and our paper
that the relation between the continuous indicators of external conditions and the occurrence of sudden stops and their
impacts on the economy is highly non-linear. We ﬁnd that the interaction effects of SS and sectoral ﬁnancial characteristics
are robust to these additional terms and that most of the interactions of HYS and ﬁnancial sector characteristics are not
statistically different from 0. Results available upon request from the authors.
19margin, as with SS*Fin, SS*Fin2 has a zero effect. Next, in columns 2 and 5, we substitute SS*Fin2
for SS*Fin1 and also ﬁnd very similar effects. Positive and signiﬁcant effects of this variable on the
creation margin and insigniﬁcant effects on the destruction margin.
Finally in columns 3 and 6 we use CCC as our proxy for liquidity needs. As with the interac-
tion (I/S)*SS, CCC*SS has a zero impact on the creation margin and a negative and statistically and
economically signiﬁcant on the destruction margin.36 Our estimates imply that, for the case of con-
tinuing (all) plants, on average the sector with the highest value for CCC exhibits a job destruction
ﬂow 3.4 (4.1) percentage points higher than the sector with the lowest value.
Thus, we conclude that our results are main robust to using alternative proxies for sectoral ﬁnan-
cial characteristics.
5C ONCLUDING COMMENTS
This paper studies the effects of sudden stops on job creation and destruction in a sample of Latin
American countries, as captured by a measure of gross job ﬂows at the sector level. We ﬁnd consistent
evidence that sudden stops are associated with decreased job creation and, particularly, increased job
destruction. Importantly, we also observe the magnitude of the sectoral effects of the sudden stops
on job ﬂows to be related to ﬁnancial characteristics of the sector: job creation tends to decrease more
during sudden stops in sectors with strong dependence on external ﬁnance. Similarly, the increasing
effect of sudden stops on job destruction is larger in sectors with higher liquidity needs. Simple
calculations show that the associated sector differences are economically signiﬁcant.
Studying the connection between reallocation and restructuring, and ﬁnancial characteristics in
response to sudden stops moves us forward in two different, but related, areas. First, and central
to the main interest of this paper, it provides us with a novel look at the mechanics of sudden stops
within countries. Since differences in the creation and destruction ﬂows can affect the speed of adjust-
ment and recovery during and after shocks, our results also signal the relevance of further studying
the dynamics of the ﬂows in the labor markets before, during and after a sudden stop, something
that we leave as a topic for further research. Moreover, to the extent that the responses of different
sectors are correlated with ﬁnancial characteristics, the empirical results also suggest that we should
incorporate ﬁnancial market frictions into our study of the effects of sudden stops and why these
differ across countries. The results on the relation between external ﬁnancial dependence (i.e., Rajan-
Zingales type of measures), liquidity needs (e.g., cash conversion cycle and inventories over sales),
and the response of gross job ﬂows to a country level shock, a sudden stop in this case, also comple-
ment previous studies on the relation between ﬁnancial frictions and sectoral outcomes, in particular
with respect to the effects on volatility and sensitivity to shocks.
Finally, as sudden stops constitute large ﬁnancial shocks for a country as a whole, we also con-
tribute to the literature on job ﬂows, reallocation/restructuring, and ﬁnancial conditions by present-
ing additional evidence from this “extreme” shock in emerging economies, which complements the
existing evidence drawn from the effects of recession and business cycles in developed economies.
36Actually the statistical signiﬁcance of results using CCC as proxy for sectoral liquidity needs is higher than when we
use (I/S). We still choose to be conservative and to present results using (I/S) as our main estimates.
20Therelationbetweensectoralﬁnancialcharacteristics, sectorresponsestosuddenstopsandtheﬁnan-
cial nature of the shock lends support to the idea that ﬁnancial conditions do matter for the process
of restructuring. Moreover, these results are qualitatively relevant for other situations and relate to
the existing evidence on the microeconomic responses to macroeconomic shocks, particularly about
the different responses of job creation and destruction.
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25Table 2. Sample Coverage and Months in Sudden Stop














26Table 3. Job Creation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel (a). All plants series
Sudden Stop (SS) -0.0228∗∗∗ -0.0227∗∗∗ -0.0228∗∗∗ -0.0302∗∗ -0.0291∗ -0.0308∗∗ -0.0314∗∗
(0.00534) (0.00531) (0.00532) (0.0148) (0.0168) (0.0130) (0.0145)
I/S*SS -0.160 -0.0278 -0.0359 -0.0226 -0.0382 -0.153 -0.0690
(0.104) (0.128) (0.130) (0.116) (0.219) (0.129) (0.138)
Fin*SS -0.0429∗∗∗ -0.0407∗∗ -0.0407∗∗ -0.0407∗∗ -0.0148 -0.0324 -0.0373∗
(0.0159) (0.0198) (0.0193) (0.0181) (0.0346) (0.0201) (0.0203)
Labor Regulation Costs*SS 0.0308 0.0268 0.0322 0.0298
(0.0576) (0.0633) (0.0491) (0.0579)
Rule of Law*SS -0.00322 -0.00306 -0.00344 -0.00302
(0.00396) (0.00459) (0.00356) (0.00401)
N 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 466
Adjusted R2 0.599 0.602 0.601 0.600 0.725 0.474 0.674 0.620
Panel (b). Continuing plants series
Sudden Stop (SS) -0.0165∗∗∗ -0.0166∗∗∗ -0.0165∗∗∗ 0.000561 0.00144 -0.0000378 -0.000487
(0.00398) (0.00397) (0.00395) (0.0105) (0.0126) (0.0102) (0.0103)
I/S*SS -0.0868 0.0381 0.0299 0.0388 0.0630 -0.0796 0.0120
(0.0807) (0.0945) (0.0938) (0.0904) (0.165) (0.101) (0.0985)
Fin*SS -0.0355∗∗∗ -0.0386∗∗∗ -0.0385∗∗∗ -0.0386∗∗∗ -0.0287 -0.0327∗∗ -0.0372∗∗∗
(0.0116) (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0141) (0.0260) (0.0158) (0.0141)
Labor Regulation Costs*SS -0.0695 -0.0722 -0.0682∗ -0.0701∗
(0.0425) (0.0476) (0.0385) (0.0424)
Rule of Law*SS 0.000794 0.000905 0.000573 0.000935
(0.00291) (0.00345) (0.00280) (0.00294)
Observations 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 466
Adjusted R2 0.525 0.530 0.529 0.533 0.673 0.423 0.610 0.554
One-way ﬁxed effects C,S,Y C,S,Y C,S,Y C,S,Y S C Y C,S,Y
Two-way ﬁxed effects No No No No CY SY CS No
LRER*sector dummies No No No No No No No Yes
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. C: country ﬁxed effects, S:
sector ﬁxed effects, Y: year ﬁxed effects
27Table 4. Job Destruction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel (a). All plants series
Sudden Stop (SS) 0.0522∗∗∗ 0.0516∗∗∗ 0.0522∗∗∗ 0.0478∗∗∗ 0.0504∗∗∗ 0.0481∗∗∗ 0.0485∗∗∗
(0.00569) (0.00571) (0.00570) (0.0175) (0.0176) (0.0147) (0.0170)
I/S*SS 0.283∗∗ 0.237∗ 0.247∗ 0.228∗ 0.229 0.275∗ 0.209
(0.121) (0.141) (0.139) (0.120) (0.230) (0.146) (0.143)
Fin*SS 0.0331∗ 0.0142 0.0142 0.0143 0.0210 0.0206 0.0201
(0.0193) (0.0223) (0.0224) (0.0187) (0.0364) (0.0228) (0.0228)
Labor Regulation Costs*SS 0.0175 0.00818 0.0168 0.0189
(0.0614) (0.0664) (0.0558) (0.0616)
Rule of Law*SS 0.00166 0.00199 0.00178 0.00141
(0.00446) (0.00482) (0.00405) (0.00450)
N 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 466
adj. R2 0.585 0.583 0.585 0.584 0.729 0.468 0.613 0.605
Panel (b). Continuing plants series
Sudden Stop (SS) 0.0412∗∗∗ 0.0406∗∗∗ 0.0412∗∗∗ 0.0569∗∗∗ 0.0573∗∗∗ 0.0572∗∗∗ 0.0581∗∗∗
(0.00538) (0.00534) (0.00537) (0.0157) (0.0134) (0.0116) (0.0154)
I/S*SS 0.282∗∗ 0.241∗∗ 0.216∗∗ 0.208∗∗ 0.0881 0.257∗∗ 0.192∗
(0.109) (0.103) (0.105) (0.0996) (0.175) (0.115) (0.109)
Fin*SS 0.0317 0.0125 0.0127 0.0127 0.0280 0.0155 0.0156
(0.0196) (0.0194) (0.0189) (0.0156) (0.0277) (0.0179) (0.0194)
Labor Regulation Costs*SS -0.0624 -0.0645 -0.0631 -0.0626
(0.0522) (0.0506) (0.0438) (0.0523)
Rule of Law*SS -0.00373 -0.00372 -0.00361 -0.00384
(0.00375) (0.00367) (0.00318) (0.00378)
Observations 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 466
Adjusted R2 0.559 0.555 0.558 0.571 0.688 0.488 0.604 0.597
One-way ﬁxed effects C,S,Y C,S,Y C,S,Y C,S,Y S C Y C,S,Y
Two-way ﬁxed effects No No No No CY SY CS No
LRER*sector dummies No No No No No No No Yes
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. C: country ﬁxed effects, S:
sector ﬁxed effects, Y: year ﬁxed effects
28Table 5. Net Creation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel (a). All plants series
Sudden Stop (SS) -0.0750∗∗∗ -0.0744∗∗∗ -0.0750∗∗∗ -0.0779∗∗∗ -0.0794∗∗∗ -0.0788∗∗∗ -0.0800∗∗∗
(0.00848) (0.00842) (0.00848) (0.0268) (0.0263) (0.0224) (0.0266)
I/S*SS -0.443∗∗ -0.265 -0.283 -0.251 -0.268 -0.428∗ -0.278
(0.187) (0.221) (0.222) (0.166) (0.344) (0.222) (0.237)
Fin*SS -0.0761∗∗∗ -0.0549 -0.0549∗ -0.0550∗∗ -0.0358 -0.0530 -0.0575∗
(0.0281) (0.0335) (0.0331) (0.0259) (0.0543) (0.0347) (0.0343)
Labor Regulation Costs*SS 0.0133 0.0186 0.0153 0.0108
(0.0985) (0.0992) (0.0849) (0.102)
Rule of Law*SS -0.00488 -0.00505 -0.00522 -0.00443
(0.00671) (0.00720) (0.00616) (0.00699)
N 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 466
adj. R2 0.484 0.485 0.485 0.484 0.710 0.336 0.500 0.519
Panel (b). Continuing plants series
Sudden Stop (SS) -0.0578∗∗∗ -0.0572∗∗∗ -0.0577∗∗∗ -0.0563∗∗ -0.0559∗∗∗ -0.0572∗∗∗ -0.0586∗∗∗
(0.00767) (0.00756) (0.00763) (0.0229) (0.0212) (0.0183) (0.0225)
I/S*SS -0.369∗∗ -0.203 -0.186 -0.169 -0.0250 -0.336∗ -0.180
(0.160) (0.166) (0.170) (0.151) (0.277) (0.182) (0.181)
Fin*SS -0.0673∗∗∗ -0.0511∗ -0.0512∗ -0.0513∗∗ -0.0567 -0.0482∗ -0.0528∗
(0.0254) (0.0270) (0.0272) (0.0236) (0.0438) (0.0284) (0.0278)
Labor Regulation Costs*SS -0.00711 -0.00771 -0.00510 -0.00753
(0.0819) (0.0800) (0.0694) (0.0825)
Rule of Law*SS 0.00452 0.00463 0.00418 0.00477
(0.00566) (0.00581) (0.00503) (0.00577)
Observations 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 466
Adjusted R2 0.539 0.541 0.541 0.541 0.690 0.446 0.571 0.575
One-way ﬁxed effects C,S,Y C,S,Y C,S,Y C,S,Y S C Y C,S,Y
Two-way ﬁxed effects No No No No CY SY CS No
LRER*sector dummies No No No No No No No Yes
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. C: country ﬁxed effects, S:
sector ﬁxed effects, Y: year ﬁxed effects
29Table 6. Falsiﬁcation Exercises
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: All plants Continuing plants All plants Continuing plants
Dependent Variable: Job Creation Job Destruction
Sudden Stop (SS) -0.0212 0.00904 -0.0184 0.0111
(0.0176) (0.0208) (0.0141) (0.0139)
Labor Regulation Costs*SS 0.129∗ -0.0761 0.111∗ -0.0778
(0.0735) (0.0743) (0.0594) (0.0508)
Fin*SS -0.0160 0.0413 -0.0147 0.0331
(0.0269) (0.0308) (0.0220) (0.0220)
I/S*SS 0.00143 0.127 -0.0511 0.0880
(0.174) (0.169) (0.138) (0.126)
Rule of Law*SS -0.00799 -0.000317 -0.00550 0.00165
(0.00531) (0.00561) (0.00426) (0.00390)
N 450 450 450 450
Adjusted R2 0.483 0.259 0.363 0.228
One-way ﬁxed effects C,S,Y C,S,Y C,S,Y C,S,Y
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. C: country ﬁxed effects, S:
sector ﬁxed effects, Y: year ﬁxed effects
Table 7. Sudden Stops and Financial Crises, Instrumental Variable estimations; all plants series
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: All plants Continuing plants All plants Continuing plants
Dependent Variable: Job Creation Job Destruction
Fin*FC -0.138∗ 0.0482 -0.131∗∗ 0.0428
(0.0738) (0.0863) (0.0620) (0.0739)
(I/S)*FC -0.126 0.866 0.105 0.789
(0.480) (0.556) (0.351) (0.492)
N 484 484 484 484
Adjusted R2 0.637 0.611 0.554 0.522
One-way ﬁxed effects C,S,Y C,S,Y C,S,Y C,S,Y
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. C: country ﬁxed effects, S:
sector ﬁxed effects, Y: year ﬁxed effects
30Table 8. Robustness checks
Dependent variable: Job Creation Job Destruction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel (a). All plants series
Fin*SS -0.0452∗∗ -0.0312 -0.0419∗∗ -0.0502∗∗∗ – 0.0105 0.0130 0.0172 0.0187 –
(0.0190) (0.0214) (0.0180) (0.0190) (0.0250) (0.0259) (0.0216) (0.0280)
I/S*SS -0.0648 -0.146 -0.0199 -0.119 – 0.251∗ 0.329∗∗ 0.242∗ 0.319∗ –
(0.124) (0.141) (0.121) (0.122) (0.150) (0.162) (0.138) (0.166)
(I/S)*SS*Trade Openness 0.470 -0.155
(0.813) (0.860)
(Fin)*SS*Trade Openness 0.0513 0.0837
(0.124) (0.141)
(I/S)*SS*Fixed Exchange Rate Regime 0.542 -0.495
(0.334) (0.309)
(Fin)*SS* Fixed Exchange Rate Regime -0.0549 0.0586
(0.0506) (0.0572)
(I/S)*SS*Labor market reform -0.0366 -0.0172
(0.137) (0.164)
(Fin)*SS*Labor market reform 0.00547 -0.0142
(0.0211) (0.0267)
N 484 448 484 421 484 448 484 421
Adjusted R2 0.616 0.606 0.630 0.596 0.603 0.601 0.593 0.602
Panel (b). Continuing plants series
Fin*SS -0.0423∗∗∗ -0.0372∗∗ -0.0407∗∗∗ -0.0457∗∗∗ -0.0276∗∗ 0.0100 0.0130 0.0177 0.0130 0.0190
(0.0133) (0.0152) (0.0134) (0.0132) (0.0115) (0.0209) (0.0212) (0.0196) (0.0224) (0.0173)
I/S*SS 0.000373 -0.0627 0.0399 -0.0419 0.00143 0.237∗∗ 0.290∗∗ 0.193∗ 0.308∗∗ 0.190∗∗
(0.0894) (0.103) (0.0901) (0.0884) (0.0762) (0.116) (0.122) (0.106) (0.123) (0.0895)
(I/S)*SS*Trade Openness 0.339 -0.296
(0.584) (0.650)
(Fin)*SS*Trade Openness 0.0560 0.0556
(0.0898) (0.112)
(I/S)*SS*Fixed Exchange Rate Regime 0.442∗∗ -0.308
(0.222) (0.220)
(Fin)*SS* Fixed Exchange Rate Regime -0.00240 0.00840
(0.0394) (0.0485)
(I/S)*SS*Labor market reform -0.0429 0.0723
(0.0911) (0.122)
(Fin)*SS*Labor market reform 0.0102 -0.0241
(0.0132) (0.0231)
N 484 448 484 421 646 484 448 484 421
Adjusted R2 0.551 0.550 0.591 0.470 0.528 0.576 0.582 0.588 0.583
One-way ﬁxed effects C,S,Y C,S,Y C,S,Y C,S,Y C,S,Y C,S,Y C,S,Y C,S,Y C,S,Y C,S,Y
Countries incuded BRA, CHL BRA, CHL BRA, CHL BRA, CHL ARG, BRA BRA, CHL BRA, CHL BRA, CHL BRA, CHL ARG, BRA
COL, MEX COL, MEX COL, MEX COL CHL, COL COL, MEX COL, MEX COL, MEX COL CHL, COL
MEX, URU MEX, URU
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. C: country ﬁxed effects, S:
sector ﬁxed effects, Y: year ﬁxed effects. ARG: Argentina, BRA: Brazil, CHL: Chile, COL: Colombia, MEX: Mexico,
URU: Uruguay.
31Table 9. Alternative Deﬁnitions of Sectoral Financial Characteristics
Dependent variable Job Creation Job Destruction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel (a). All plants series
Sudden Stop (SS) -0.0305∗∗ -0.0304∗∗ -0.0303∗∗ 0.0478∗∗∗ 0.0478∗∗∗ 0.0480∗∗∗
(0.0148) (0.0147) (0.0148) (0.0175) (0.0174) (0.0174)
Labor Regulation Costs*SS 0.0316 0.0314 0.0312 0.0175 0.0174 0.0170
(0.0578) (0.0577) (0.0579) (0.0612) (0.0613) (0.0611)
Fin1*SS -0.0415∗∗ 0.000758
(0.0186) (0.0210)
I/S*SS -0.0674 -0.0112 0.291∗∗ 0.261∗
(0.119) (0.128) (0.131) (0.149)
Rule of Law*SS -0.00335 -0.00332 -0.00328 0.00167 0.00169 0.00176







N 484 484 484 484 484 484
Adjusted R2 0.600 0.601 0.600 0.584 0.584 0.586
Panel (b). Continuing plants series
Sudden Stop (SS) 0.000243 0.000351 0.000367 0.0569∗∗∗ 0.0569∗∗∗ 0.0570∗∗∗
(0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0156)
Labor Regulation Costs*SS -0.0688 -0.0690 -0.0691 -0.0624 -0.0624 -0.0627
(0.0427) (0.0427) (0.0427) (0.0522) (0.0523) (0.0521)
Fin1*SS -0.0358∗∗∗ 0.00243
(0.0135) (0.0171)
I/S*SS -0.00857 0.0271 0.251∗∗ 0.250∗∗
(0.0868) (0.0931) (0.105) (0.119)
Rule of Law*SS 0.000676 0.000716 0.000722 -0.00372 -0.00372 -0.00367







N 484 484 484 484 484 484
Adjusted R2 0.532 0.532 0.533 0.571 0.571 0.573
One-way ﬁxed effects C,S,Y C,S,Y C,S,Y C,S,Y C,S,Y C,S,Y
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. C: country ﬁxed effects, S:
sector ﬁxed effects, Y: year ﬁxed effects
32Table A.1. Descriptive Statistics: Job Creation and Destruction, main countries.
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Max Min p5 p50 p95
Brazil
Creation (Continuing) 72 0.088 0.024 0.147 0.044 0.055 0.084 0.131
Creation (All) 72 0.158 0.035 0.245 0.085 0.101 0.154 0.218
Destruction (Continuing) 72 0.108 0.026 0.183 0.056 0.069 0.104 0.160
Destruction (All) 72 0.164 0.032 0.263 0.104 0.120 0.159 0.220
Chile
Creation (Continuing) 160 0.082 0.041 0.213 0.006 0.020 0.078 0.156
Creation (All) 160 0.119 0.055 0.267 0.010 0.034 0.116 0.221
Destruction (Continuing) 160 0.074 0.046 0.294 0.005 0.023 0.067 0.151
Destruction (All) 160 0.119 0.070 0.370 0.005 0.029 0.109 0.255
Colombia
Creation (Continuing) 189 0.067 0.026 0.135 0.011 0.027 0.067 0.116
Creation (All) 189 0.095 0.034 0.197 0.025 0.038 0.094 0.156
Destruction (Continuing) 189 0.105 0.043 0.316 0.029 0.047 0.099 0.173
Destruction (All) 189 0.103 0.042 0.310 0.029 0.047 0.098 0.170
Mexico
Creation (Continuing) 63 0.126 0.041 0.254 0.064 0.076 0.124 0.201
Creation (All) 63 0.174 0.055 0.310 0.098 0.105 0.174 0.296
Destruction (Continuing) 63 0.078 0.029 0.171 0.035 0.045 0.069 0.134
Destruction (All) 63 0.105 0.041 0.232 0.047 0.058 0.094 0.185
Main Countries
Creation (Continuing) 484 0.083 0.038 0.254 0.006 0.028 0.078 0.152
Creation (All) 484 0.123 0.053 0.310 0.010 0.040 0.116 0.215
Destruction (Continuing) 484 0.092 0.043 0.316 0.005 0.033 0.086 0.166
Destruction (All) 484 0.118 0.055 0.370 0.005 0.046 0.111 0.215
All Countries
Creation (Continuing) 646 0.075 0.038 0.254 0.006 0.025 0.071 0.145
Destruction (Continuing) 646 0.091 0.041 0.316 0.005 0.035 0.085 0.162
33Table A.2. Description of the main variables used in the paper.
Variable Source Description
Creation from Haltiwanger et al
(2004)
Job creation by ﬁrms in a given sector, country and year;
see equation (3).
Destruction from Haltiwanger et al
(2004)
Job destruction by ﬁrms in a given sector, country and
year; see equation (4).
SS own construction, based
on Gallego and Jones
(2005)
Fraction of the year that the country is in a sudden stop.
Fin from Raddayz (2006) Computation of the original Rajan and Zingales (1998)
measure of (long-run) external ﬁnance dependence. Un-
like our previous two measures, this corresponds to the
median ﬁrm for the 2-digit sector, and not to the mean of
the median ﬁrm of each subsector.
Fin1 own construction based
on RZ (1998) data
Mean across subsectors of the original Rajan-Zingales
measure of ﬁnancial dependence.
Fin2 own construction based
on Micco and Pages (2006)
data
Mean across subsectors of the Micco and Pages (2006)
computation of the Rajan-Zingales measure of ﬁnancial
dependence.
I/S from Raddatz (2006) Medianratioofinventoriestosalesin1980-1989intheUS,
using Compustat data.
CCC from Raddatz (2006) Median across ﬁrms of the cash conversion cycle variable.
It estimates the length in days between a ﬁrm pays for
its raw materials and it receives the payment for the ﬁnal
sales. We express this variable in hundreds of days.
Labor own construction using
data from La Porta et al
(2004)
We consider the sum of ﬁring and dismiss.
ﬁring from La Porta et al (2004) It measures how expensive it is for a ﬁrm to ﬁre 20% of the
workers; it includes all the compensations and penalties
needed to pay in this case.
dismiss from La Porta et al (2004) It counts the number of measures a ﬁrm must undertake
in order to be able to dismiss a worker; the variable used
is the ratio of procedures required as a fraction of the total
number of procedures considered (seven).
Net from Haltiwanger et al
(2004)
Net employment growth by ﬁrms in a given sector, coun-
try and year, see equation (2)
RER from IFS and local central
banks
Effective real exchange rate, year average, 1995=1.
Note: The series Inv/Sales, CCC and Fin were generously provided by Claudio Raddatz.
34Table A.3. Dataset Characteristics by Country
Country Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Uruguay
Type data Job Job + Work-
ers
Job Job Job + Work-
ers
Job
Source INDEC RAI ENIA EAM
DANE
IMSS INE





Manuf Manuf Private Manuf
Unit Firms Plants Plants Plants Firms Plants
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